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Abstract—PCBs are the core components for the devices ranging from
the consumer electronics to military applications. Due to the accessi-
bility of the PCBs, they are vulnerable to the attacks such as probing,
eavesdropping, and reverse engineering. In this paper, a solution named
EOP is proposed to migrate these threats. EOP encrypts the inter-chip
communications with the stream cipher. The encryption and decryption
are driven by the dedicated clock modules. These modules guarantee
the stream cipher is correctly synchronized and free from tampering.
Additionally, EOP also incorporates the PCB-level obfuscation for pro-
tection against reverse engineering. EOP is designated to be accom-
plished by utilizing the COTS components. For the validation, EOP is
implemented in a Zynq SoC based system. Both the normal operation
and tampering detection performance are verified. The results show that
EOP can deliver the data from one chip to another without any errors. It
is proved to be sensitive to any active tampering attacks.
1 INTRODUCTION
Printed circuit boards (PCBs) are essential components for
electronic systems, ranging from consumer electronics to
military applications. Due to the PCBs’ proprieties (e.g.,
large size, exposed connections, etc.), they are vulnerable
to various attacks like probing, eavesdropping, hardware
tampering, and reverse engineering. Tampering attacks tar-
get the exposed PCB-level connections (e.g., copper traces,
component solder pads) and can be classified into two types:
passive and active [1]. Passive tampering is implemented
by monitoring sensitive data traffic between electronic com-
ponents. Active tampering works by injecting malicious
data/instructions into the system, modifying the PCB, etc.
Furthermore, active tampering attacks can diminish the
strength of the obfuscation-based protection against reverse
engineering [2]. The rapid spread of IoT devices could
empower tampering attacks to induce greater damages. For
instance, a tampered device with the internet accessibility
can be deployed as a botnet to execute distributed denial-
of-service (DDoS) attacks, steal sensitive/private data, and
even allow the attacker to access the connections of the bot-
nets. Additionally, by tampering the consumer electronics
(e.g., video game consoles), illegal users can bypass vendor
copyright [3].
A common implementation of the active tampering at-
tack can be implemented by installing a modchip (modi-
fication chip). A modchip is a small electronic device that
can be used to alter or disable the artificial restrictions of
computers or entertainment devices. Modchips are mainly
utilized in tampering the video game consoles (as shown in
Figure 1) and DVD or Blu-ray players [3]. Besides media
devices, routers and networking equipment on route to
foreign locations were reportedly intercepted and tampered
by the National Security Agency (NSA) [4] for surveillance
purposes. A load station installed a beacon firmware to
monitor and redirect user data. The equipment was then
resealed and sent to its destination.
In [5], a framework was developed to hide critical inter-
chip traces within the middle layers of a multi-layer PCB.
The traces chosen are ones connected to chips with the
ball grid array (BGA) package. The pins of this type of
package are located at the bottom of the chip. While com-
bining the middle-layer routing and BGA package, both the
passive and active tampering attacks can be prevented by
reducing the physical accessibility to the traces. However,
these design requirements limit the applicability of this
approach. To accomplish passive tampering detection, a
board-level framework, named MPA, was introduced in
[6]. This framework provides an accurate measurement of
the trace impedance changes. By applying this approach,
even the tiny changes induced by the passive tampering
can be detected. The major drawbacks of this approach
are (a) a dedicated detection phase is required prior to the
normal operation, and (b) the genuine device should be
Fig. 1. Modchip installed on the video game consoles (s) Xbox 306 and
(b) Nintendo Gamecube. The modchip is marked in the red rectangle.
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2enrolled before sold in the market. Thus, this approach is
not appropriate for the high-volume applications (e.g., IoT).
Another PCB vulnerability to be seriously concerned
about is reverse engineering. The techniques for accom-
plishing this attack can be classified as destructive and
non-destructive [2]. While comparing with the chip-level
reverse engineering, it is much easier to apply such attacks
at the PCB level. The reverse engineering attacks cause the
disclosure of the PCB design, enabling copies to enter the
market as well as providing information for other physical
attacks.
Previous physical security requirements of known se-
curity standards (Federal Information Processing Standard
(FIPS 140-2) [7], and Payment Card Industry Hardware
Security Module (PCI HSM) [8]) do not specifically address
the tampering and reverse engineering attacks. Thus, they
cannot provide practical guidance for design verification
within this scenario.
In this paper, we propose an encryption-obfuscation
based protection to provide the PCB-level assurance (EOP).
EOP encrypts the real-time communication between critical
inter-chip connections. More specifically, the encryption is
realized by applying XOR logic between the plaintext mes-
sage and the one-time-pad (OTP). In order to select a proper
cryptography system which is suitable for the real-time
applications, we investigated various cryptography tech-
niques, such as the block and stream ciphers. A hardware-
oriented stream cipher is implemented as the OTP. It is
synchronized by a control clock, which is generated and
verified by the dedicated modules. The EOP is designated
to incorporate with the systems with the commercial-off-
the-shelf (COTS) components. The major contributions of
this work are:
• The EOP framework is proposed to protect the criti-
cal data paths of PCBs from tampering attacks. This
framework can be combined with other existing ap-
proaches, such as obfuscation, to prevent the board-
level reverse engineering.
• Based on the tampering protection targets and goals,
we investigate the appropriateness and security of
the available ciphers (e.g., block ciphers and stream
ciphers). A non-linear stream cipher is implemented
for EOP.
• A secure synchronization strategy of the stream ci-
pher is proposed. This strategy consists of a key
management/initialization phase. By monitoring the
plaintext and encrypted messages, this strategy gen-
erates and verifies the stream cipher synchronization
signals.
• EOP is implemented on the Xilinx SoCs, and its
performance against various tampering attacks is
validated.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
provides the background and comparison of various types
of ciphers. Moreover, the best cipher implementation candi-
date to protect the PCB-level secret is introduced with de-
tails. In Section 3, security requirements are presented as the
protection design guidelines. Following these guidelines,
the details of EOP are given. The design of the cryptography
and other control models are also presented in this section.
Besides the framework, its robustness against various at-
tacks is also discussed in Section 4. The experimental setup
and validation results are presented in Section 5. Finally, we
conclude in Section 6.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section, we first review several ciphers and compare
their applicability for real-time systems. Next, a hardware-
oriented cipher, which will be implemented in EOP, is
introduced. Finally, a brief introduction of the obfuscation-
based PCB anti-reverse engineering scheme (referred as PCB
obfuscation scheme for the rest of the paper) is provided.
2.1 Block Cipher vs. Stream Cipher
In cryptography, cipher designs can be classified into two
categories depending on how the plaintext is partitioned
[9]. In a block cipher, the plaintext is divided into relatively
large (e.g., 128 bit) blocks which are encoded separately.
The encoding of each block depends on at most one of the
previous blocks. Most block cipher algorithms are classified
as iterated block ciphers where fixed-size blocks of plaintext
are transformed into identical size blocks of ciphertext, via
the repeated application of an invertible transformation.
Data Encryption Standard (DES) and Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES) are well-known block ciphers. DES has a
fixed block size of 64 bits, while the block size for AES is
128 bits. For each block, the same key is applied.
Different from the large block size of the block cipher,
stream ciphers operate on plaintext in a bitwise fashion
[10]. A stream cipher is a symmetric key cipher where the
plaintext digits are combined with a pseudorandom cipher
stream (keystream). In a stream cipher, each plaintext digit
is encrypted one at a time with the corresponding digit
of the keystream. This digit is typically a 1-bit data, and
the encryption operation is usually based on exclusive-or
(XOR). The pseudorandom keystream is typically generated
serially from a random seed using digital shift registers,
such as a linear feedback shift registers (LFSR). Other stream
ciphers can be constructed by operating a block cipher in
stream mode [11].
Both block cipher and stream cipher have their advan-
tages and limitations, a comparison is provided in Table 1.
For block ciphers, information from one plaintext is diffused
into several ciphertext blocks. It is difficult to insert symbols
without being detected. This modification can be detected
with a separate message authentication code such as CBC-
MAC for each block. One major limitation of the block
cipher is that an entire block must be accumulated before the
encryption/decryption begins. Moreover, the block ciphers
are slow due to multiple iterations for both the encryption
and decryption. For the stream ciphers, the algorithm is
linear in time, and the error in one symbol will not affect
its subsequent symbols. However, the diffusion is low since
all information of the plaintext is contained in a single
ciphertext symbol. Moreover, the algorithm of the stream
cipher is not designed to detect the illegal symbol insertions.
Considering our application scenario, a primary require-
ment for encrypting the chip-to-chip communication is the
real-time capability. For instance, assume the sender chip
3TABLE 1
Comparison of the block cipher and stream cipher
Block cipher Stream cipher
Diffusion High Low
Insertion detection Yes No
Speed of transformation Slow Fast
Error propagation High Low
transmits a high-frequency control signal to the receiver
chip. If a block cipher (e.g., DES) is implemented, the
encryption and decryption processes introduce a significant
delay to this signal transmission. This delay might be an
issue for systems that have strict requirements on speed.
Additionally, since the block cipher has a fixed (e.g., 64-bit)
block size, the efficiency is low if the width of this control
signal is less than the block size. For the stream ciphers (e.g.,
LFSR), a new keystream bit can be generated in each clock
cycle. As a result, the stream cipher introduces negligible
delay during the encryption and decryption. Besides the de-
lay issue, the encryption and decryption of the block ciphers
consist of multiple rounds. These procedures consume more
resources than the stream ciphers. Thus, stream ciphers are
more appropriate for encrypting and/or obfuscating the
real-time communication between different chips. Hence,
in this paper, we adopt a stream cipher. Note that since
they are vulnerable to tampering/insertions and reverse
engineering, we must introduce additional mechanisms into
EOP (see Sections III-C).
Based on the mechanisms of updating the internal states,
stream ciphers can be classified as linear and non-linear
stream ciphers, respectively. A linear stream cipher updates
the next state by applying a linear function of its previous
states. A widely-implemented example is LFSR. However,
the LFSR is usually considered as insecure due to the low
complexity, i.e., a small fragment of the keystream can be
used to deduce the entire sequence. A trivial attack example
is provided in Section 4.1 against the linear stream cipher.
To increase the complexity of stream ciphers, non-linear
mechanisms have been developed. In the following section,
a non-linear cipher is introduced and implemented in EOP.
2.2 Trivium Cipher
Trivium is a synchronous stream cipher designed to provide
a flexible trade-off between the operation speed, overhead of
hardware and software implementation. It was submitted to
the Profile II (hardware) of the eSTREAM competition which
is organized by the EU ECRYPT network [12]. This cipher
belongs to the non-linear stream cipher category and is
inspired by the block cipher in stream-mode. It is initialized
by loading an 80-bit key and an 80-bit initialization vector
(IV) into the 288-bit initial state. An output bit can be
generated after each cycle. The operation of the Trivium
cipher is described in Algorithm 1. Note that here, and in
this algorithm, the + and · operations stand for addition and
multiplication over GF(2) (i.e., XOR and AND). The output
bit (zi) of the cipher is generated according to the internal
state (s1, . . . , s288). The internal state is self-updated accord-
ing to its previous value. In this algorithm, the notations
Algorithm 1 Trivium key stream generation [14]
1: for i = 1 to K do
2: t1 ← s66 + s93
3: t1 ← s162 + s177
4: t1 ← s243 + s288
5: z1 ← t1 + t2 + t3
6: t1 ← t1 + s91 · s92 + s171
7: t1 ← t1 + s91 · s92 + s171
8: t1 ← t1 + s91 · s92 + s171
9: (s1, s2, . . . , s93)← (t3, s1, . . . , s92)
10: (s94, s95, . . . , s177)← (t1, s94, . . . , s176)
11: (s178, s279, . . . , s288)← (t2, s178, . . . , s287)
12: end for
t1, t2, and t3, indicate the temporary values. The width of
the keystream can be easily extended up to 64-bits without
increasing the number of flip-flops. Other than the flip-
flops, the number of logic gates (e.g., AND and XOR gates)
increases linearly with the key width. The estimated gate
counts are provided in Table 2. The Trivium cipher is proven
to be secure against various attacks, such as guess and
determination attacks, algebraic attacks, resynchronization
attacks, etc. [13].
2.3 PCB Obfuscation
The obfuscation-based solutions have been developed to
prevent reverse engineering on both chip and board levels
[2]. In the board-level technique described in [5], a per-
mutation block is inserted to shuffle the original inter-chip
connections. This permutation block behaves like a router
to navigate the signal from one chip to another. A key is
applied to the permutation block to determine the input-
output relationship. Only if a correct key is loaded will
the signals be navigated to the correct path. In this case,
the system is referred as operating in the functional mode.
Otherwise, the system works in the obfuscated mode.
In the functional mode, the permutation block continu-
ally connects its inputs to the designated outputs. Thus, an
attacker can inject a signal with a distinguishable frequency
or pattern on one of the inputs of a permutation block
in the functional mode. By monitoring all the outputs for
this injected signal, the attacker could discover the correct
input-output relationship. Applying this attack on the PCB
is straightforward since the connections among chips are
usually exposed and easy to tamper. Certain restrictions
were proposed to restrict this attack: (i) the permutation
block and at least one chip connected with it should be of
BGA package; (ii) the internal connections between these
two BGA chips should be routed within the middle layers
of the PCB [5]. By incorporating a stream cipher, we shall
avoid such restrictions.
TABLE 2
Estimated gate counts of 1-bit to 64-bit hardware implementations [14]
Key steam width 1-bit 8-bit 16-bit 32-bit 64-bit
Flip-flops 288 288 288 288 288
AND gates 3 24 48 96 192
XOR gates 11 88 176 354 704
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In this section, we propose several security requirements for
the PCB-level protection. Next, the general requirements for
implementing EOP are provided in Section 3.2. According
to these requirements, different application scenarios are
presented. Finally, the major building blocks are elaborated
in Section 3.3 and 3.4.
3.1 Security Requirements
Before presenting EOP, the security requirements (SR) are
discussed. These requirements aim to counter the hardware
vulnerabilities of the digital systems, especially consumer
electronics. The security requirements are listed as follows:
• SR-1: Passive tampering protection. The device shall
prevent the disclosure of sensitive information by
external monitoring.
• SR-2: Active tampering protection. The device shall
monitor or prevent unauthorized changes to the
inter-chip signals.
• SR-3: Run-time tampering protection. The device
shall constantly guarantee SR-1 and SR-2 during any
operation stages once the device is on.
• SR-4: Reverse engineering prevention. The PCB de-
sign shall be protected from any physical reverse
engineering whether power is on or off.
SR-1 and SR-2 define the capability of a mechanism
against tampering attack. This capability can be accom-
plished by either preventing or detecting tampering activi-
ties. SR-3 defines the tampering protection capability during
runtime. SR-4 ensures that the system cannot be copied by
applying the reverse engineering attack.
3.2 Implementation Overview
The requirements for implementing the framework and
application scenarios are shown in Figure 2. We assume that
the connections between chip 1 and chip 2 are potential
targets of the tampering attack. Since EOP relies on the
stream cipher, certain cryptographic capabilities are manda-
tory (details are discussed in Section 3.3). According to this
figure, EOP can be determined as: (a) fully applicable,
(b) conditionally applicable, (c) obfuscation simplification
and (d) encryption-obfuscation combination.
For all these scenarios, chip 1 is assumed as the core com-
ponent of the system, e.g., microprocessor, FPGA, etc. Thus,
the cryptography capability assumption can be considered
as valid for chip 1. If this capability is also supported by
chip 2 (Figure 2(a)), EOP is fully applicable. This scenario
requires no hardware modification on the original design.
The conditionally applicable scenario (Figure 2(b)) occurs
when chip 2 has no cryptography capability. In this scenario,
EOP cannot be directly applied without the design modifica-
tions. One straightforward modification is replacing chip 2
with a crypto-enabled component (e.g., FPGA) if the original
functionality of chip 2 is maintained.
If the modification mentioned above is not achievable,
EOP can still be utilized to simplify board-level obfuscation
[5]. In the original obfuscation framework, an obfuscation
block (chip 3 in Figure 2(c)) is inserted to permute the inter-
chip communications. By encrypting the data paths between
Fig. 2. General requirements for implementing EOP and application sce-
narios: (a) fully applicable, (b) conditionally applicable, (c) obfuscation
simplification, and (d) encryption-obfuscation combination.
Fig. 3. Block diagram of EOP. The internal logic of the encryption module
(Enc. module) is presented in (a), and the internal logic of the decryption
module (Dec. module) is presented in (b). The notations p, e, and k
stands for the plain data, encrypted data, and key pad respectively.
chip 1 and chip 3, the previously enforced design require-
ments (i.e., the BGA package and middle-lay routing) can be
relaxed. In this scenario, only the data flow between chip 1
and chip 3 is encrypted. Finally, the application scenario (a)
can be combined with the board-level obfuscation as shown
in Figure 2(d). Different from (c), all the data flows between
chip 1, 2 and 3 are encrypted. EOP should be implemented
independently for chip 1/chip 3 and chip 3/chip 2. In this
scenario, chip 3 decrypts and re-encrypts the data with
different keypads.
Figure 3 shows the block diagram of EOP. This frame-
work consists of four major modules: encryption module,
decryption module, control clock generation module, and
control clock verification module. The first two modules
(referred as the crypto modules) encrypt and decrypt the
messages from chip 1 and chip 2. The last two modules
generate and verify the control clock to drive the first two
modules. These modules are elaborated in the following sec-
tions. In Figure 3, the one-way communication is assumed
between chip 1 and chip 2 (i.e., data are sent by chip 1
to chip 2). If the two-way communication is desired, the
control clock generation and verification modules should be
implemented in both chips. For simplicity, only the one-way
communication scenario is discussed in this paper.
53.3 Crypto Modules
In EOP, the encryption and decryption modules both consist
of an N -bit Trivium cipher and an array of N exclusive OR
gates (XORs). The value N equals to or greater than the
number of data paths to be encrypted. The Trivium cipher
generates a N -bit keypad vector k. Besides the encrypting
and decrypting tasks, these modules also take the responsi-
bility of managing or synchronizing the key.
For the sender side (chip 1 in Figure 3), each keypad
bit, kn(t), is XORed with one data path (pn(t)). As shown
in the Figure 3(a), this operation generates a 1-bit cipher
message, en(t), for each data path. These cipher messages
are then transmitted to the decryption module of chip 2.
In the decryption module, the cipher messages are XORed
with the keypad vector in a bit-wise manner. In normal
operation, the Trivium ciphers in the encryption and decryp-
tion modules share the same keys as they employ the same
keypads. To ensure that the keypad vectors are consistently
synchronized on both the chips, the control clock modules
are implemented. Details are elaborated in the following
section.
As mentioned in Section 2.2, the Trivium cipher is ini-
tialized by loading an 80-bit key and an 80-bit initial vector.
These values define the starting points of the stream cipher.
Thus, the initial values should be synchronized between
the encryption and decryption modules during each power-
up. Additionally, these values should be changed for each
power-up. This step is critical to guarantee that the correct
data will be received at the receiver side. By changing the
initial values during each power-up, the attacker cannot dis-
cover these values through the records of previous power-
ups.
Two strategies can be implemented to accomplish this
objective, as shown in Figure 4. For the RSA based scheme
(4(a)), the initial seed Stini is generated in the encryption
module by a true random number generator (TRNG) [15].
Next, this seed is encrypted with the RSA public key
(RSApub) and transmitted to the decryption module. In
the decryption module, the initial seed can be recovered
by the RSA private key (RSApri). In this case, the RSA
algorithm should be implemented in both the encryption
and decryption modules. Moreover, a TRNG should be
implemented in the encryption module.
For the self-updating based scheme shown in Figure
4(b), two pseudo-random number generators (PRNGs) with
identical structure are implemented in the encryption and
decryption module, respectively. The initial seed for both
modules is updated by its previous value. When the
firmware is loaded into the system by a trusted party, an
arbitrary value is embedded as the first seed. This value will
be utilized as the start state of the PRNG. At the tth power-
up, the PRNG accepts the previous seed (St−1ini ) as the start
state to generate the current seed (Stini). To ensure the same
seeds are synchronized in both encryption and decryption
modules, the hash values of the current seeds may be
computed. Next, the hash value in the encryption module is
forwarded to the decryption model. By comparing its hash
value and the received one, the decryption module verifies
whether the same seed is generated.
Fig. 4. Seed initialization strategies: (a) share the seed with RSA; (b)
seed self-updating.
3.4 Control Clock Modules
The working mechanism of the control clock generation
module is shown in Algorithm 2. The pseudocode is pre-
sented in the hardware description language (HDL) style.
The module generates the control clock by taking the plain
data paths as inputs. The flipping event time instances
(i.e., t0 and t1 in Algorithm 2) are monitored and updated
consecutively. The flipping event is defined as any value
change of any data path, which is selected to be encrypted.
For instance, assuming the number of data paths (i.e., N )
is 8, a transit from 8′b00000000 to 8′b00000001 will be
considered as a flipping event.
Algorithm 2 Control clock generation
1: Input: plain data paths (pn(t))
2: Output: control clock (clk)
3: t0 ← 0 . initial flipping time instance
4: always @(any signal in pn(t) flips)
5: t0 ← t1 . store previous flipping time instance
6: t1 ← current time instance
7: if t1 − t0 > thr then
8: produce clk . generate a control clock pulse
9: end if
10: end always
The control clock generation flow can be described as
following. First, as shown in lines 5 to 6 in Algorithm 2,
the previous flipping event time instance is stored, and the
current value is updated. Next, the time interval between
two contiguous flipping events (i.e., t0 and t1) are checked
(line 7). Finally, a control clock pulse is produced when this
time interval is longer than the threshold, thr. This pulse
should have the minimum possible width. The steps as
shown in lines 7 to 9 are utilized to prevent the potential
glitches. These glitches may be induced by two flipping
events which are too close to each other. The threshold for
preventing the glitches can be assigned experimentally by
the designer.
In general, the control clock generation module guar-
antees that a control clock pulse is produced when any
data path changes its value. This control clock drives the
stream cipher to produces the keypad vector and fetches
new encrypted data. Thus, the encrypted data are generated
slightly after the rising edge of the control clock pulse.
Algorithm 3 provides the function description of the
control clock verification module. This module accepts the
6Algorithm 3 Control clock verification
1: Input: encrypted data paths (en(t))
2: Input: control clock (clk)
3: Output: verification status (ver)
4: tdata1 ← 0 . initial flipping time instance
5: always @(clk or any signal in en(t) flips)
6: if clk flips then
7: tclk ← current time instance, then Hold
8: if data path flipping event presents then
9: ver ← Safe
10: else
11: ver ← Tampered
12: end if
13: end if
14: if en(t) flips then
15: tdata0 ← tdata1
16: tdata1 ← current time instance
17: if tdata0 ≤ tclk and tdata1 ≥ tclk then
18: ver ← Safe
19: else
20: ver ← Tampered
21: end if
22: end if
23: end always
incoming encrypted data and control clock as its inputs.
The output is the verification status which is either safe
or tampered. In general, this module verifies whether the
received control clock is unmodified after generated. To
achieve this goal, the flipping events of the control clock
and encrypted data path are monitored (line 5 in Algorithm
3). The verification status, ver, can be developed by com-
paring the recorded time instances. This comparison can be
introduced as two situations concerning the type of flipping
events detected. These situations are described as following.
Control clock flipping event is detected (line 6 to 13):
The latest control clock flipping event is recorded as tclk
(line 7). Once this time instance is stored, the verification
module holds briefly for a data path flipping event. This
holding operation is implemented due to the short delay
between the control clock and the encrypted data. If a data
flipping event presents, the system can be considered as safe
(line 8 to 10).
Data path flipping event is detected (line 14 to 22): As
shown in line 15 to 16, the time instances of the latest and its
contiguous encrypted data flipping events are recorded as
tdata0 and t
data
1 . Besides these two time instances, the latest
control clock flipping events is also recorded as tclk (line 7).
An example can be found in Figure 5. This example shows a
safe verification status (i.e., ver ← Safe). According to the
waveform group s2 in this figure, tdata0 is recorded at time
instance 5. tdata1 is recorded slightly behind time instance
7. The tclk is recorded at time instance 7. The verification
module compares the time instances of the current and
previous data path flipping events with the control clock
flipping event. Only if clock flipping event is observed in
between of two adjacent data path flipping events, it implies
that the system is safe (line 17 to 18).
Two violation scenarios are provided in Figure 5. The
Fig. 5. Example of control clock verification situations. Two violation
scenarios are present as the following: (a) data missing and (b) control
clock missing.
time instances from t = 0 to t = 10 are shown at the top
of the figure. For the waveform group s1, a control clock
flipping event is detected at t = 7. However, no data path
flipping event is detected after this control clock pulse. Thus,
the tampering activity should be considered as happening at
t = 7. This tampering activity can be either an external hold
of the encrypted data or a fake control clock pulse. For the
waveform group s2 in Figure 5, an encrypted data flipping
event is recognized at t = 3. Its previous flipping event
is recorded at t = 1. However, no control clock flipping
event is observed between the time instances 1 and 3. Thus,
tampering on either the encrypted data path or the control
clock should be considered as happening at t = 3.
4 ATTACK ANALYSIS
In the section, the capability of EOP against various attacks
is discussed. These discussions are organized by different
application scenarios shown in Figure 2. These scenarios are
roughly classified into two categories: (i) partial encryption
(scenario (c)) and (ii) full encryption (scenario (a) and (d)).
For the partial encryption scenario, the linear stream cipher
is also considered as the keystream generation option for
EOP. By analyzing this option, we illustrate that the non-
linear stream cipher is crucial in this scenario.
4.1 Partial encryption
The application scenario (c) in Figure 2(c) is referred to as
partial encryption since only the data flow between chip
1 and chip 3 is encrypted. The data flow between chip
3 and chip 2 is unprotected due to the crypto capability
limitation of chip 3. Thus, only the reverse engineering
attack is considered in this scenario. As discussed in Section
2, the linear stream cipher is not secure enough due to the
limited number internal states. To justify that the utiliza-
tion of non-linear stream cipher is necessary, the reverse
engineering attack is investigated against both types of the
stream ciphers.
In this application scenario, the obfuscation block (i.e.,
chip 3) consists of the permutation block, decryption model,
and the control clock verification model. It decrypts the
received data by XORing them with the keypad. These
decrypted data are then sent to chip 2 directly without re-
encryption.
Since the obfuscation is enforced to prevent reverse
engineering, the connections between chip 1 and chip 2
7Fig. 6. An example of the attack on EOP when the linear stream cipher is engaged.
Fig. 7. Tampering attacks on the obfuscation block: (a) only the permu-
tation is implemented, and (b) EOP is combined with the permutation.
are permuted by the obfuscation block. Thus, the attacker’s
goal is to discover the correct input-output relationships of
the obfuscation block. To achieve this goal, three attacking
scenarios are present in Figure 6.
The most straightforward attack flow is shown as (a)→
(b) → (c) → (d) in Figure 6. The attacker injects a periodic
signal into one input of chip 3 and monitors the outputs
for a match. This attacking scheme is illustrated in Figure
7(a). The matched signal path is shown as the red dashed
line. However, this attack cannot be applied directly since
solely changing the data path leads to a violation of the
control clock verification module (as noted in Algorithm 3,
line 12). To avoid such violation, a more advanced attack
flow is (a) → (e) → (f) → (g), in which a pulse is also
injected to the control clock while a data path flipping event
presents. If the decryption module receives a control clock
pulse, it updates the keypad. This keypad is constructed by
combining the keystream bits from multiple linear stream
ciphers in parallel. Thus, all the outputs will change their
values at the same time when a control clock is received.
This attacking scheme is presented in Figure 7(b). Since the
attacker injects the periodic signal into one input (the rest of
the inputs are hold low), only one output is expected to flip
for a successful match. However, the control clock pulses
force all the outputs flip at the same frequency. In this case,
it is impossible to achieve this match. Thus, the attack is
defeated.
In order to achieve the matching while passing the
control clock verification, the attack flow (a) → (c) →
(h)→ (i)→ (j) can be applied. The core step of this flow is
recovering the inputs from the monitored outputs (step (i)
in Figure 6). To accomplish this recovery, the attacker needs
to apply XOR on the output with the current keypad. Note
that the keypad is generated by the linear stream cipher
such as LFSR and its structure is assumed as public. Thus,
the next keypad is predictable when the current state is
obtained. Since the attacker has access to both the plaintext
and ciphertext, he can obtain an arbitrary length of the
keystream bits. For the LFSR, the keystream bits are equal
to the state bits. Thus, the current state can be obtained
by exhaustive search (i.e., brute force), and the rest of the
keystream bits can be generated. Finally, the keypad, which
is constructed by the keystream bits, can be predicted. With
this predicted keypad, the attacker can recover the inputs
of obfuscation block from the outputs and perform the
matching.
To eliminate this attack, the stream cipher must perform
the non-linear feedback function with a sufficient number
of internal states. For instance, the Trivium cipher consists
of a 288-bit internal state register which provides more than
4.97e+86 internal states. Concerning the current computing
power, this number is sufficient for preventing brute force
attacks.
4.2 Full encryption
Both the application scenarios (a) and (d) in Figure 2 are
referred to as full encryption, which means that all the criti-
cal data flows are encrypted. For both scenarios, the passive
and active tampering attacks are analyzed. For the scenario
(d), the reverse engineering attack is also considered besides
the tampering attacks. Being introduced in Section 1, the
load station in the Cisco router is the device to achieve the
passive tampering. This device is implanted by the attacker
and eavesdrops the user data. These user data are sent to
the attacker by the load station. The Xbox mod-chip can be
viewed as an example of the active tampering. Unlike the
load station, the Xbox mod-chip not only monitors the user
data but also modifies these data. These modified data cre-
ate fake messages to the system (e.g., mislead the copyright
check module). In most of the cases, the active tampering
consists of the passive tampering and data modification.
Thus, once the active tampering is prevented, the passive
tampering is eliminated.
Active tampering manipulates the inter-chip communi-
cations by injecting designated data such as malicious sig-
nals to bypass the authentication process. By implementing
EOP, the attacker cannot inject meaningful data without
knowing the keypad. In other words, the decrypting equa-
tion of the data received by the target chip behaves like a
black box for the attacker. For the passive tampering, the
attacker only has access to the encrypted data flow. Similar
to the active tampering case, the attacker cannot obtain the
plaintext without the knowledge of the keypad. As stated in
the previous section, the keypad cannot be predicted when
the non-linear stream cipher is employed.
For the reverse engineering attack, the full encryption
scenarios provide even stronger protection compared with
the partial encryption scenario. Different from application
8scenario (c), the application scenario (d) consists of two
encryption-decrypting processes (i.e., chip 1 to chip 3 and
chip 3 to chip 2). In this situation, the data flow is encrypted
by chip 1 and sent to the obfuscation block (chip 3). Next,
this obfuscation block decrypts the received data flow and
re-encrypts it. Eventually, the re-encrypted data flow is sent
to chip 2 for the final decryption. These two encryption-
decrypting processes are initialized by different key and IVs
(initial vectors). Additionally, the attacker only has access
to the ciphertext of both processes. Thus, it is impossible to
predict the keypads and perform the matching.
In summary, the attacks described in Section 1 are fully
addressed by EOP. The tampering attack, such as the mod-
chip and load station implanting, are eliminated by the full
encryption scenarios. The reverse engineering attacks are
defeated by combining with the board-level obfuscation [5]
with EOP. By taking advantages of EOP, the implementation
of the obfuscation is significantly simplified from a PCB
design perspective.
5 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, the following experiments are conducted
to validate the performance of proposed framework. To
verify that the encrypted data can be decrypted correctly,
these data are generated under different conditions. This test
confirms that EOP maintains the correct system functional-
ity when no tampering attacks are occurring. Besides the
normal operation test, we apply the active tampering attack
on the data path and the control clock to demonstrate the
tampering detection sensitivity. These experimental results
are collected from both simulations and the hardware imple-
mentations. Before providing these results, the experimental
platform setups are introduced.
5.1 Platform Setups
Figure 8 shows a schematic setup of the testing platform. In
our experiment, the application scenario (a) in Figure 2 is
implemented. In this setup, the sender (chip 1) is assumed
to send critical data to the receiver (chip 2). This sender
consists of three modules:
• The internal logic module generates the random
signals with a width of 8 bits. These signals are
utilized to mimic the plaintext data (p(t)) which is
generated by the sender.
• The Trivium module takes the following responsibil-
ities: updating the keypads and performing the XOR
operation between the plaintext data and the keypad
to produce the encrypted data (e(t)).
• The control clock generate module accomplishes
the function which is described in 3.4. This module
takes the signal from the internal logic module and
produces the control clock (clk ctrl).
For the sender, the encrypted data (e(t)) and the control
clock (clk ctrl) will be sent to the receiver. At the same
time, the plaintext data (p(t)) are transmitted to the host PC
through UART for further analyses. p(t) is also monitored
by the digital channels of the oscilloscope (OSC) for the
debug purpose.
Fig. 8. Schematic of the testing environment. The original plain data
(p) and decrypted data (p′) are captured by the digital oscilloscope and
collected by the PC.
Different from the sender, the internal logic module is
not implemented in the receiver (chip 2). For the receiver,
the Trivium module performs the similar functionality but
produces the decrypted plaintext data (p′(t)). p′(t) is sent
to the host PC and monitored by the OSC for comparison.
The received control clock is also verified by the receiver.
A counter is implemented in the control clock verification
module to record the number of tampering induced viola-
tions.
The actual hardware implementation described above
schematic is shown in Figure 9. The Xilinx ZYBO develop-
ment boards with the Zynq SoC are utilized to implement
the sender and receiver. This SoC consists of a single-core
ARM Cortex-A9 processor and a 28nm Artix-7 based pro-
grammable logic (PL). The modules shown in Figure 8 are
implemented in the PL, while the processor configures and
collects the signals from the PL. It serves as a bridge between
the PL and the host PC. This setup is straightforward to be
applied on the commercial PCBs with COTS components.
A breadboard is used to connect the sender and receiver
through jumper wires. The digital channels of the OSC are
connected with this breadboard to monitor the plaintext
data and decrypted data. These data are also sent to the
Fig. 9. Hardware setups of the full applicable scenario (Figure 2(a))
9TABLE 3
Violation counts under different tampering durations.
Tampering durations (5ns base) 1× 5× 10× 100×
Average violations
Control clock 1.02 5.08 10.05 100.01
Data path 1.05 5.10 10.10 100.07
host PC through the onboard UART.
5.2 Validation Results
For validating the normal operation of EOP, various plain-
text data are generated by the internal logic of the sender.
These signals are generated by multiple LFSRs with the
following characteristics: (i) Uniform frequency: all the 8
data paths update their values at the same frequency. These
values are determined by the outputs of the 8 LFSRs. A
single clock drives these LFSRs for the next state. (ii) Ran-
dom frequency: different from the former case, the LFSRs
are driven by eight clocks with random frequencies. The fre-
quencies of these LFSR clocks are controlled by the SoC and
range from 5MHz to 200MHz in a step size of 10MHz.
Since different signal generation modes and frequencies
are utilized, we apply the following three phases to conduct
the experiment: initialization, execution, and pause. During
the initialization phase, PL waits for the initial configura-
tions (i.e., frequencies) from the processor. This is the default
phase and the test system enters this phase upon startup.
The execution phase sends a global start signal to the PL.
All the modules start their functionalities based on the initial
configurations. For the pause phase, all modules halt their
current states and wait for further phase selection signal.
During this phase, the counter in the receiver sends the
number of violations to the PC.
The host PC collects both p(t)andp′(t) once the commu-
nication is established between the sender and the receiver
(i.e., execution phase is set). p(t) and p′(t) are compared
instantly when their values are changed. As the nominal
operation validation, no tampering is applied, and the
validation target is the decryption correctness. The full
encryption-decryption procedure is constantly executed for
one hour under all frequency corners. The aforementioned
comparison between p(t) and p′(t) are made. The number
of mismatches is reported to the PC at the end of each
evaluation. The experimental results demonstrate that the
receiver can consistently decrypt the correct data and no
decryption errors are found during all the experiments.
Aside from the nominal operation validation, we also
conduct the active tampering attacks on EOP. Both the
data paths and the control clock are manipulated in our
experiment. Prior to presenting the silicon results, the post-
implementation simulation results are shown in Figure 10.
This post-implementation simulation is accomplished by the
Xilinx Vivado ISim. Since it considers the physical properties
of the design, the timing is close to the silicon results. In this
figure, the yellow signals indicate the current phase (i.e.,
initialization, execution, and pause phase), while the green
signals refer to the generic signals, the red ones refer to the
tampered signals, and the white signals show the number
of violations.
TABLE 4
Technical comparison
Metrics
Security
enclosure [16]
Obfuscation
[5]
MPA
[6]
EOP
Crypto
models
No No No Yes
# of RNGs 0 0 0 1
Implement
overhead
High Medium Medium Low
Other
requirements
Limited
applications
Package
and routing
HIGH-Z
JTAG
None
SR
coverage
SR-1,
SR-2, SR-3
SR-4
SR-1,
SR-2
ALL SR*
* See the text for the detailed SR coverage considering
different application scenarios
During the execution phase (phase sel = 1), three tam-
pering attacks are applied. These attacks are separated by
the red vertical dashed lines and numbered as 1, 2, and
3 in this figure. Among all the tampering attacks, 1 and 2
indicate the control clock tampering attack. Attack 3 refers
to the data path tampering attack. All the attacks attempt
to force the signal to ground. In total, four control clock
violations are applied (one during attack 1 and three during
attack 2). All the four data path tampering violations are
contributed by the attack 3. The last two signals in Figure
10 confirm the functionality of the control clock verification
block.
Besides the simulations results, these tampering attacks
are conducted on the actual hardware. A function generator
and tristate buffers are utilized to tamper the connections
between the sender and receiver actively. The function
generator controls the tristate buffers to ground these con-
nections for different durations. The basic unit of these
durations is the shortest period for the sender to update
the plain data (i.e., 200Mhz/5ns). The testing conditions and
results are presented in Table 3.
The first row in Table 3 indicates the tampering durations
which are expressed as how many times of the smallest data
path updating period (i.e., 5ns). Theoretically, one violation
should be counted once when the tampering period is 5ns.
However, since this tampering signal is not aligned with
control clock and may last slightly longer than designed,
more than one violation might be recorded. This situation
is rare, and only appears when the tampering occurs right
after a rising edge of the control clock. Since its duration
may be longer than 5ns, it may also affect the next control
clock rising edge.
Table 4 compares the previous and proposed techniques
which are designated to meet the security requirements, SR-
1 to SR-4. Among all the techniques, only EOP demands
the cryptography modules and the random number gen-
erator (RNG). These components are utilized to initial and
accomplish the encryption process. The security enclosure
[16] introduces the highest implementation overhead due
to the demands of the hard metal case and sensors. Since
only one additional chip (e.g., CPLD/FPGA) is installed,
the techniques (obfuscation [5] and MPA [6]) are considered
as medium overheads. EOP presents the lowest overheads
10
Fig. 10. Simulation results for the active tampering.
considering no extra components might be introduced. This
claim is true besides achieving the anti-reverse engineering
requirement (SR-4).
Considering the implementation restrictions, the security
enclosure [16] can be only implemented in a limited number
of applications. These applications should not experience
frequent movements and temperature variations. Thus, se-
curity enclosure is not suitable for many consumer electron-
ics. The obfuscation based approach [5] requires specified
packages (e.g., BGA) and dedicated routing schemes (i.e.,
routing in the middle layers). MPA [6] configures the pins’
JTAG infrastructure into the HIGH-Z mode. However, this
mode is an optional mode of the JTAG standard and may not
be universally available.. For EOP, there are no significant
constraints for the PCB.
For the SR coverage (detailed SR definitions in Sec-
tion 3.1), since the security enclosure targets the protection
against tampering, it fails to satisfy SR-4 (anti-reverse en-
gineering). The same situation is applied for the MPA [6]
which is only designed against tampering. Additionally,
the run-time requirement (SR-3) is not applicable on MPA
since it requires a detecting phase. During this phase, the
system cannot perform its normal function. For the obfus-
cation based approach [5], the BGA package and middle-
layer routing only protect part of the critical paths from
tampering. The paths between the obfuscation block and the
non-programmable components cannot be hidden because
few non-programmable components have BGA package.
Among all the techniques in Table 4, only EOP (application
scenario (d)) thoroughly covers all the SRs.
6 CONCLUSION
We proposed a framework named EOP to mitigate multiple
practical attacks on a PCB, such as tampering, hardware
Trojan, and reverse engineering. EOP encrypts the inter-chip
communications by keypads. These keypads are generated
by the non-linear stream cipher and updated with the
control clock. The switch activities of this control clock and
data paths are correlated. This correlation is verified by a
dedicated module against the tampering attacks. EOP can be
utilized to combine with the board-level obfuscation tech-
nique to provide the most comprehensive solution for the
PCB-level assurance. For validation, EOP is implemented
in Zynq SoCs. Various operation frequencies and tampering
detection performance are verified. The results confirm the
detection accuracy of EOP.
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